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vision in the Model Code would remove the only serious objection to
Rule 405 as it now stands. There should be no reason why a competent
and willing expert could not be found if the trial judge, acting under
Rule 410, provides for an adequate fee. Thus modified, the provisions
of the Model Code would seem to answer most of the problems confronting the expert witness and the party-litigant who needs his services.
While the expert's fee would be provided for, the litigant who is financially unable to hire an expert witness would nevertheless have the
advantage of his services.
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Admissibility of Documentary Evidence to Impeach Witness-In Gordon v.
United States, 73 S.Ct. 369 (1953), a case involving the unlawful possession
and transportation of stolen goods in interstate commerce, petitioners were
convicted largely on a statement made by Marshall, the chief prosecuting witness. On cross-examination it was brought out that Marshall, between the
time of his apprehension and his final statement to the Government, had
made three of four statements which did not implicate petitioners. A request
that the trial judge order the Government to produce these earlier statements
was denied. Cross-examination also revealed that prior to his statement
incriminating petitioners, the prosecuting witness had pleaded guilty to the
possession of stolen property in a Federal Court in Detroit, and was still
unsentenced although nine months had elapsed. The trial judge refused to
admit into evidence a transcript of the Detroit proceeding which indicated
that Marshall had been warned he could expect no recommendation for
lenient sentence or probation unless he satisfied the probation department
he had given his complete cooperation to the law enforcement agencies.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings on the ground that
Marshalls' admission, on cross-examination, of the implicit contradiction between the documents and his testimony removed the need for resort to the
statements, and the admission was all the accused were entitled to.
The Supreme Court, however, speaking first on the exclusion of the prior
statements which did not incriminate petitioners, held these exclusions to
be prejudicial error. By cross-examination defense counsel had laid a foundation for his demands by showing the documents existed, were in the possession
of the Government, were contradictory to present testimony, and were relevant
to material matters bearing on the main issue. He was therefore entitled to
a court order requiring production of the documents. The excluded documents were a more reliable and complete source of information than a mere
description of them, and would best inform the jury as to the document's
impeaching weight and significance.
It was also error to refuse to admit the transcript of the prior case involving
Marshall, as it was a question for the jury as to what effect the words of the
judge might have had upon his mind and conduct.
Evidence Allegedly Obtained by Illegal Means; Who May Assert Rights
Under "Search and Seizure" Clause-In United States v. Weinberg, 108 F.
Supp. 567, (D.D.C. 1952), defendant was indicted by a Grand Jury and
charged with perjury under Title 22, §2501 of the District of Columbia Code.
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Defendant sought to set aside the indictment and to suppress evidence allegedly obtained by illegal means; i.e., interception of telephone communications, mail, and the recording of conversations in private homes. He also
specifically denied being a party to particular calls which he contended
initiated a surveillance of his activities.
The Court refused to set aside the indictment, holding that the defendants
affidavit's did not allege that any evidence would in fact be offered by the
Government based on intercepted messages, and did not give reasonable assurances [as required by Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ] that
the challenged evidence was tainted.
Defendant was also precluded from the relief sought as he was not in a
position to assert the right. Relying on Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S.
114 (1942), the Court held that so long as he refused to affirmatively identify
himself as a party to the intercepted communications, he was not within the
purview of the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and
seizure.
Use of Perjured Testimony to Obtain a Conviction-In United States v. Spadafora, 200 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1952), appellant filed a petition in the district
court to vacate trial court proceedings which he alleged were fraudulent. To
support the petition he cited inconsistent testimony, attached affidavits from
himself and a co-defendant, and two other affidavits in the possession of the
clerk of the court which were claimed would show him innocent. Appellant's
affidavit also made numerous statements as to what various people would
testify if called as witnesses; i.e., that certain witnesses at the trial had perjured themselves.
While holding that the petition might properly have been dismissed under
Title 28 U.S.C. §2255 (Supp. 1952), the court nevertheless considered the
merits. As a general proposition, a criminal conviction procured by the use
of testimony known by the prosecuting authorities to be perjured, and knowingly used by them in order to procure a conviction, violates the defendant's
constitutional rights. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). But a defendant has the burden of making a showing, not only that material perjured
testimony was used to convict him, but that it was knowingly and intentionally used by the prosecuting authorities in order to do so. Cobb v. Hunter, 167
F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1948). In the present case it was held the petitioner had
not made a substantial showing. Trivial conflicts in testimony do not constitute perjury, and unsupported broad charges that perjury was committed by some witnesses or that perjured testimony was knowingly used will
not suffice.
Cross-Examination Question on Defendant's Prior Plea of Guilty-In State
v. Weekly, 252 P.2d 246 (Wash. 1952), defendant had pleaded guilty to
the charge of attempted rape, but later obtained leave to withdraw this plea
and enter a plea of not guilty. During the trial, the prosecuting attorney
asked him the following question: "Mr. Weekly, on the 3rd day of September,
1951, did you appear in Judge Greenough's Court with your counsel, and
enter a plea of guilty to this charge?" Objection to the question was sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard it. Defendant contended on
appeal that the question was so prejudicial the trial court erred in not
declaring a mistrial.
In sustaining the conviction, the majority in the court held the defendant
must show that counsel did not act in good faith, and that asking the question
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was in fact prejudicial. The good faith of counsel could be tested by these
inquiries: Was the question based upon facts established by the record? Was
it material and relevant? Did counsel have any basis for a belief that the
court would overrule an objection to it? Did counsel abide by the ruling of
the court and not pursue the inquiry after the objection was sustained?
The court resolved these questions in favor of the prosecuting attorney. Nor
was defendant prejudiced in not being permitted to explain the circumstances under which he made his plea of guilty. This privilege is allowed
only on affirmance of the admission, which was not done in this case.
Mr. Justice Weaver, dissenting, applying what seems to be the majority
rule, was of the opinion that the prosecutor's question, although stricken,
was so prejudicial to appellant that no instruction to the jury could obviate
its damaging effects. Merely asking it was enough to prevent a fair trial.
See Kercheval v. 'UnitedStates, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) ; and cases referred to
in 124 A.L.R. 1527 (1940).
Mr. Justice Finley, dissenting specially, argued that changing a plea of
guilty to one of not guilty is permitted and recognized as a right of the
accused. During trial, the accused is entitled fully and completely to the
benefit of a presumption of innocence, which will vanish if the prosecutor is
entitled to ask the accused whether he had initially pleaded guilty to the
crime charged.
Prejudicial Remarks of Court Directed at Defense Counsel-n Mcfahan v.
State, 251 P.2d 204 (Old. Or. App. 1952), defendant contended that the
trial court was guilty of misconduct in the swearing in of witnesses at the
commencement of the trial and in making statements directed at the defendant's counsel which created prejudice against the accused in the minds of
the jury. In the presence of the jury, the trial judge told defense counsel:
"You cannot pull this one on me in this court."
The court held that there was no apparent justification for the remarks;
that such remarks, in reprimand, are highly prejudicial if made in the
presence of the jury, and may furnish grounds for reversal. In the present
case, because of the absolute guilt of the accused established by the evidence,
the court contended itself with modifying the sentence.
But see People v. Amnaya, 251 P.2d 324, 328 (Cal. 1952). If the supposed
prejudicial words are used by the court in an explanatory sense, having
reference to a purported ambiguity in the wording of a question posed by
defense counsel, no error results.
Appeal by Prosecutor to Pecuniary Interest of Jury-In State v. Muskus, 109
N.E.2d 15 (Ohio, 1952), defendant was tried for murder. He contended that
the prosecuting attorney, in his closing argument to the jury, made certain
statements so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The prosecutor implied
that defendants' own lawyers considered him guilty, and also that it would
cost the county considerably more money if they gave defendant a prison
sentence rather than send him to the electric chair. Repeated objections to
the arguments were made by counsel for the defendant but were overruled by
the trial judge with a direction to the prosecuting attorney to "proceed".
The court held that such arguments would have a highly prejudicial effect
on the minds of the jurors, particularly where tacit approval was accorded
by the trial judge in directing the prosecutdr to proceed. Such conduct
served effectively to prevent consideration by the jury of the element of
mercy unimpaired by prejudice. The case was remanded for a new trial.

